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The aim of this study is to assess and compare the proliferation resistances (PR) of three possible Gener-
ation IV lead-cooled fast reactor fuel cycles, involving the reprocessing techniques Purex, Ganex and a
combination of Purex, Diamex and Sanex, respectively. The examined fuel cycle stages are reactor opera-
tion, reprocessing and fuel fabrication. The TOPS methodology has been chosen for the PR assessment, and
the only threat studied is the case where a technically advanced state diverts nuclear material covertly.
According to the TOPS methodology, the facilities have been divided into segments, here roughly repre-
senting the different forms of nuclear material occurring in each examined fuel cycle stage. For each seg-
ment, various proliferation barriers have been assessed. The results make it possible to pinpoint where the
facilities can be improved.
The results show that the proliferation resistance of a fuel cycle involving recycling of minor actinides is
higher than for the traditional Purex reprocessing cycle. Furthermore, for the purpose of nuclear safe-
guards, group actinide extraction should be preferred over reprocessing options where pure plutonium
streams occur. This is due to the fact that a solution containing minor actinides is less attractive to a pro-
liferator than a pure Pu solution. Thus, the safeguards analysis speaks in favor of Ganex as opposed to the
Purex process.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
The lead-cooled fast reactor (LFR) is one of six reactor concepts
included by the Generation IV International Forum in the deﬁnition
of Generation IV (Gen IV) nuclear energy systems. As in other fast
reactors, the hard neutron spectrum of an LFR enables efﬁcient uti-
lization of the fuel, since a signiﬁcant amount of fertile nuclei can
be ﬁssioned by the fast neutrons. In addition, 239Pu is bred from
neutron capture in 238U nuclei. Further utilization of the fuel can
be obtained through recycling of actinides in the used fuel.
One of the goals established for the Gen IV systems is the assur-
ance that they will be ‘‘a very unattractive and the least desirable
route for diversion or theft of weapons-usable materials’’ (U.S.
DOE Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee and the Gener-
ation IV International Forum, 2002).
In support of this goal, the current study aims at comparing the
proliferation resistances (PR) of three LFR fuel cycles, involvingdifferent reprocessing techniques. For the purpose of assessing
PR on a relative scale for different reprocessing options and identi-
fying weak links, the TOPS methodology (Technological Opportuni-
ties to increase the Proliferation resistance of global civilian
nuclear power Systems) has been chosen (NERAC, 2000b).
Theexaminedfuelcyclestagesarereactoroperation,reprocessing
and fuel fabrication. In particular, this study covers three different
reprocessing techniques; Purex, Ganex and a combination of Purex,
Diamex and Sanex. Because of different compositions of the fuel,
resulting from different reprocessing techniques, the properties of
the fuel cycleswill differ. The three cases are comparedwith respect
to proliferation resistance in order to ﬁnd the option which, among
them,bestfulﬁlstheaforementionedgoal.Thescopeofthestudydoes
notincludeevaluationofimplementedsafeguardsmeasures,sinceno
safeguards approaches yet exist for the rudimentary designs of the
studiedfuelcycles. Instead,thegoalistoassesstheinherentprolifera-
tion resistanceof each facility in order to identify itsmost vulnerable
segments.
Nuclear power systems may be evaluated with respect to differ-
ent threats. Here, the only threat studied is the case where a state
diverts nuclear material covertly. Hence, the physical protection
aspect is not studied. It is also assumed that the state holds ade-
quate knowledge in nuclear technology.
This work is largely based on previous work performed by van
der Meer et al. (2010). However, the methodology used here has
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gated. Several other studies have also been performed previously
based on the same, and other, methodologies (Baron et al., 2004;
Chirayath et al., 2008; Goodman and Sprinkle, 2009; van der Meer
and Turcanu, 2009). Baron et al. (2004) recommend, among other
things, continued research and development leading to the use of
advanced fuels containing higher actinides, such as 241Am, to in-
crease the radiation barrier and thereby increase intrinsic prolifer-
ation resistance. In Goodman and Sprinkle (2009), the authors
conclude that once-through and closed fuel cycle alternatives have
complementary advantages and drawbacks. Furthermore, they
state that safeguards approaches for the once-through fuel cycle
are well known and generally considered effective, whereas ad-
vanced separation processes under consideration pose new techni-
cal challenges for safeguards, but also hopefully new opportunities
for detecting facility misuse.2. The Gen IV systems studied
The hypothetical facility examined in this work is a 100 MWe
lead-cooled fast reactor, with associated reprocessing and fuel fab-
rication capabilities included on the reactor site in a separate
building. The reactor power of 100 MWe was chosen to represent
a small reactor suitable for demonstrating the viability of lead
cooled fast reactor technology. The fuel used in the reactor is either
MOX or MOX with minor actinides (MA) incorporated in the fuel,
depending on the choice of reprocessing technique. The included
reprocessing options are:
 Purex: for U and Pu recycling only,
 Purex together with Diamex and Sanex: Purex with subsequent
separation of minor actinides and lanthanides, which enables
actinide recycling,
 Ganex: all actinides are extracted as a group.
Purex is a mature reprocessing technique that has been used
commercially for decades. It allows for the recycling of plutonium
in MOX fuel, leading to more efﬁcient use of the material and a
reduction of volume and radiotoxicity of the high level, long-lived
waste.
In order to recycle also minor actinides in fast reactors, and re-
duce the amount of waste even further, there is a multitude of no-
vel techniques under current development, e.g. Diamex–Sanex and
Ganex. The introduction of minor actinides in fuel makes it more
difﬁcult to handle for a potential diverter, mainly due to the emis-
sions of heat and ionizing radiation from curium.
Diamex–Sanex separates Am and Cm from used fuel and can be
readily combined with a preceding Purex step. It has proven suc-
cessful at a laboratory scale, and industrial implementation can
be envisaged in the near future (International Atomic Energy
Agency, 2008).
With Ganex, for which the development is a challenging long-
term goal, U, Pu and MA are separated together as a group (Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, 2008). Thus, no pure plutonium
stream occurs, which is beneﬁcial from a safeguards point of view.
The three fuel cycle options are treated separately and are re-
ferred to as facilities below.3. The TOPS assessment methodology
As a basis for this work, an existing framework for assessing and
comparing proliferation resistance is used, albeit slightly modiﬁed.
The methodology was developed by a task force established by the
Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee (NERAC) of the U.S.
Department of Energy in 1999, and is here referred to as TOPS.The TOPS task force identiﬁed a set of proliferation barriers from
which the proliferation resistance of civilian nuclear power sys-
tems are evaluated, see Fig. 1.
Each of the examined facilities is divided into segments, repre-
senting the different forms of nuclear material. The segments are
described in Section 3.2. Barrier strengths are evaluated for each
segment, as described in Section 3.3.
3.1. Barriers
The identiﬁed set of barriers is an attempt to recognize ways to
improve proliferation resistance by technology developments. Bar-
riers impeding proliferation from civil nuclear power systems may
be divided into three categories; (1) nuclearmaterial properties, (2)
technical features of equipment and facilities, and (3) institutional
measures aimed at compensating for weaknesses in the former.
Brief descriptions of the different barriers are presented below.
For more thorough explanations, see the Annex to the ﬁnal TOPS
task force report (NERAC, 2000a).
3.1.1. Material barriers
Material barriers relate to inherent material qualities that de-
scribe to which extent the material is attractive to a proliferator.
 Isotopic
The isotopic barrier speciﬁes the difﬁculty to construct a
weapon from a certain material, under the assumption that it
is in a favorable chemical form. Several attributes are of impor-
tance, e.g. critical mass, degree of isotopic enrichment, and gen-
eration of heat and radiation, which complicate the design of
weapons devices.
 Chemical
The amount and difﬁculty of chemical processing required to
form weapons-usable material, e.g. by separating the ﬁssile
material from contaminants, is addressed by the chemical
barrier.
 Radiological
High levels of ionizing radiation arising from ﬁssile materials,
the daughter products of their decay and possible admixtures
complicate diversion and handling of materials, and thereby
strengthen the radiological barrier.
 Mass and bulk
Materials that are easily concealed and transported are related
to large diversion risks, compared to bulky items. Dilute mate-
rials, which are required in large volumes to construct a
weapon, and materials incorporated in bulky conﬁgurations
(e.g. fuel assemblies) therefore strengthen this barrier.
 Detectability
Materials that are easily detectable by e.g. active or passive
methods, and materials that provide unique radiation signa-
tures that are hard to shield, increase barrier strength. However,
the detectability of ﬁssile materials must be supported by safe-
guards measures in order to have any effect on the proliferation
resistance.
3.1.2. Technical barriers
The technical barriers represent the intrinsic technical features
of facilities, equipment and processes, which obstruct proliferators’
access to materials and facilities.
 Facility unattractiveness
Facilities that can produce weapons-usable materials, or those
that can easily be modiﬁed to do so, have low barriers to prolif-
eration, whereas facilities with little or no potential for modiﬁ-
cation have high barriers, being unattractive for obtaining
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Fig. 1. Graphical overview of the TOPS methodology illustrating how the total resistance (left) is estimated based on the barrier categories (center) and barriers (right). The
dashed items have been omitted in this work, see text.
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unattractiveness barrier are facility throughput as well as time
and cost for performing modiﬁcations.
 Facility accessibility
Facilities inherently restricting access to ﬁssile material,
through, e.g. remote handling operations have higher prolifera-
tion barriers than those involving hands-on access. Institutional
barriers, such as security controls, are not included in this
barrier.
 Available mass
The amount of weapons-usable materials, in direct-use form or
potentially extractable, is important to a potential proliferator.
Large quantities, possibly corresponding to many signiﬁcant
quantities, represent a low barrier.
 Diversion detectability
Diversion detectability refers to the detectability offered by
facilities, technologies and processes themselves (as opposed
to material detectability). It differs from safeguards system
implementation in that it does not relate to features addedinstitutionally to assist in the detection of diversion. Processes
which support good detection equipment and low uncertainties
in the accountancy system result in strong barriers.
3.1.3. Additional barriers omitted in this work
The barrier Skills, expertise and knowledge has not been included
in the analysis. It is considered that a state possessing the skills
necessary for any type of fuel recycling in fast reactor cycles will
have many insights valuable for weapons production anyhow. Fur-
thermore, the barriers Time and Location will not give substantially
different results for the three fuel cycle options. The Access control
and security barrier is omitted since physical protection does not lie
within the scope of this study. Finally, the Safeguards barrier is
omitted, partly due to the fact that it is not expected to be any dif-
ferent depending on the choice of reprocessing technique. Further-
more, the Safeguards barrier relates to extrinsic measures such as
accountancy procedures, response time of detectors and inspec-
tions, and this information is not required for an assessment of
the inherent proliferation resistance of a general facility design
as covered in this paper.
Table 1
The chosen PR values ranging from 1 to 5 representing
the different barrier strengths.
PR value Description
1 Very low resistance
2 Low resistance
3 Medium resistance
4 High resistance
5 Very high resistance
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In this work, each of the three facilities is divided into segments,
roughly representing the different forms of nuclear material occur-
ring in each examined fuel cycle stage. The designation for all seg-
ments within each fuel cycle stage is a segment collection (see
Fig. 2).
3.2.1. The reactor segment collection
In a reactor, nuclear materials occur in three forms:
 Fresh fuel kept in storage.
 Fuel inside the core.
 Used fuel in storage.
The fuel is either MOX or MOX + MA, depending on the case
studied.
3.2.2. The reprocessing segment collection
The segments comprised in the reprocessing segment collection
are:
 Used fuel in storage.
 Used fuel dissolved in nitric acid.
 Different streams of nitric acid containing the separated mate-
rials. The material streams considered in this work are U, Pu,
and U + Pu + MA, depending on the chosen technique.
3.2.3. The fuel fabrication segment collection
The fuel factory involves the following segments:
 Material arriving from the reprocessing step (in either powder
or sol–gel form).
 Pellets.
 Fresh fuel elements.
Again, either MOX or MOX + MA is considered in this work.
3.3. Setting values to the proliferation resistance of a facility
3.3.1. Proliferation resistance values
Proliferation resistance values, here ranging from 1 to 5, are as-
signed to every proliferation barrier in each particular segment.
The number 1 represents a weak barrier offering very low resis-
tance to proliferation, whereas the number 5 represents a strongReprocessing
Reactor
Fuel fabrication
Fig. 2. The three segment collections deﬁned in this work, each of which comprises
segments where different forms of nuclear material occur.barrier with very high proliferation resistance (see Table 1). The
PR values should not be seen as absolute values of PR, but should
be used merely for comparison of the different fuel cycle options.3.3.2. Barrier weights
The barriers are not equally signiﬁcant to the proliferation resis-
tance of the fuel cycle, and need to be weighted. Therefore, the bar-
riers within each category have been compared pairwise regarding
signiﬁcance to the proliferation resistance, using the Analytic Hier-
archy Process (AHP). From the pairwise comparisons, a ﬁnal weight
is attained for each barrier.Each pair of barriers is assigned a value,
according to Table 2. From these values, a matrix A is constructed.
The barrier weights are then found from Aw = nw, where n is the
largest eigenvalue of A, and w is the eigenvector associated with
it. The vector w is ﬁnally normalized, such that the weights of
the material barriers sum to one, as do the weights of the technical
barriers. Because a detailed description of the AHP procedure is not
the focus of this paper, the reader is referred to Saaty (1990) for
more information.3.3.3. Aggregation of results
For the material barriers and technical barriers occurring for
each facility segment, the PR values are multiplied with the corre-
sponding barrier weights and summed over. Thus, every segment
is assigned two total resistance values; one for the material barri-
ers and one for the technical barriers.
The most vulnerable segment per segment collection and bar-
rier category, i.e. the segment with the lowest resistance value, is
chosen as a conservative representation for the full segment collec-
tion. This means that no segment collection is considered to be
more resistant to proliferation, than its weakest link.
The fresh fuel and used fuel segments are both present in more
than one segment collection. Thus, if results were aggregated over
the entire fuel cycle, double counting of the contributions from the
fresh and used fuel would occur. In this paper, however, the reac-
tor, reprocessing and fuel fabrication segment collections are eval-
uated separately to ﬁnd the respective weakest links.Table 2
Scale of measurement in pairwise comparison. Adapted from Saaty (1990).
Intensity of
importance
Deﬁnition
1 Equal importance
3 Moderate importance of one over another
5 Essential or strong importance of one over another
7 Very strong importance of one over another
9 Extreme importance of one over another
2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediate values
Reciprocals If barrier i has one of the above numbers assigned to it
compared with barrier j, then j has the reciprocal value
when compared with i
394 M. Åberg Lindell et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 62 (2013) 390–3974. TOPS analysis of three different facilities
4.1. PR values for the segments
In Tables 3–5, the assigned PR values for the different barriers
and segments are presented. The setting of the values is subject
to a certain amount of subjectivity, and it may therefore be moti-
vated to brieﬂy describe how this was done in this work.
The isotopic barrier is strongest in the separated uranium seg-
ment, since the material contains only small amounts of ﬁssile
material. In segments containing Pu, which is classiﬁed as direct-
use material, the barrier is weaker. Spontaneous emissions of neu-
trons and heat generation (e.g. from Cm in the MOX + MA fuels)
may however strengthen the barrier.Table 3
PR values for the reactor.
Barrier Fresh MOX Fresh MOX + MA MOX i
Purex case
Isotopic 3 – 2
Chemical 2 – 3
Radiological 2 – 5
Mass and bulk 4 – 4
Detectability 4 – 1
Unattractiveness 3 – 3
Accessibility 2 – 4
Available mass 1 – 1
Diversion detectability 5 – 5
Purex–Diamex/Sanex and Ganex cases
Isotopic – 4 –
Chemical – 2 –
Radiological – 3 –
Mass and bulk – 4 –
Detectability – 4 –
Unattractiveness – 3 –
Accessibility – 2 –
Available mass – 1 –
Diversion detectability – 5 –
Table 4
PR values for the reprocessing plant.
Barrier Used MOX Used MOX + MA Dissolved MOX Di
Purex case
Isotopic 3 – 3 –
Chemical 3 – 3 –
Radiological 5 – 4 –
Mass and bulk 4 – 2 –
Detectability 1 – 1 –
Unattractiveness 5 – 2 –
Accessibility 2 – 5 –
Available mass 1 – 1 –
Diversion detectability 5 – 2 –
Purex–Diamex/Sanex case
Isotopic – 4 – 4
Chemical – 3 – 3
Radiological – 5 – 4
Mass and bulk – 4 – 2
Detectability – 1 – 1
Unattractiveness – 5 – 2
Accessibility – 2 – 5
Available mass – 1 – 1
Diversion detectability – 5 – 2
Ganex case
Isotopic – 4 – 4
Chemical – 3 – 3
Radiological – 5 – 4
Mass and bulk – 4 – 2
Detectability – 1 – 1
Unattractiveness – 5 – 3
Accessibility – 2 – 5
Available mass – 1 – 1
Diversion detectability – 5 – 2As for the chemical barrier, in general, more steps are required to
extract Pu from mixed compounds, such as MOX fuel, than from
single compounds such as PuO2 powder. Furthermore, it is consid-
ered more difﬁcult to work with used fuel than fresh fuel, due to
the emission of heat and radiation.
The radiological barrier reaches its highest value for newly dis-
charged used fuel, which is considered self-protecting. This barrier
is also rather high for segments where safety measures such as hot
cells and remote handling are required.
The mass and bulk barrier is low in segments where nuclear
material is present in high concentrations. It is, however, strength-
ened if the material is difﬁcult to conceal and transport (e.g.
mounted fuel assemblies).n core MOX + MA in core Used MOX Used MOX + MA
– 3 –
– 3 –
– 5 –
– 4 –
– 1 –
– 5 –
– 3 –
– 1 –
– 5 –
4 – 4
3 – 3
5 – 5
4 – 4
1 – 1
3 – 5
4 – 3
1 – 1
5 – 5
ssolved MOX + MA Separated U Separated Pu Separated U + Pu + MA
5 2 –
1 1 –
1 3 –
4 1 –
3 3 –
3 2 –
3 4 –
4 1 –
2 2 –
5 2 4
1 1 3
1 3 4
4 1 2
3 3 3
3 2 3
3 4 5
4 1 1
2 2 2
5 – 4
1 – 3
1 – 4
4 – 2
3 – 3
3 – 3
3 – 5
4 – 1
2 – 2
Table 5
PR values for the fuel factory.
Barrier MOX powder MOX + MA powder MOX pellets MOX + MA pellets MOX fuel elements MOX + MA fuel elements
Purex case
Isotopic 3 – 3 – 3 –
Chemical 2 – 2 – 2 –
Radiological 2 – 2 – 2 –
Mass and bulk 2 – 2 – 4 –
Detectability 3 – 3 – 4 –
Unattractiveness 5 – 5 – 3 –
Accessibility 2 – 2 – 2 –
Available mass 1 – 1 – 1 –
Diversion detectability 2 – 3 – 5 –
Purex–Diamex/Sanex and Ganex cases
Isotopic – 4 – 4 – 4
Chemical – 2 – 2 – 2
Radiological – 3 – 3 – 3
Mass and bulk – 2 – 2 – 4
Detectability – 3 – 3 – 4
Unattractiveness – 5 – 5 – 3
Accessibility – 2 – 2 – 2
Available mass – 1 – 1 – 1
Diversion detectability – 2 – 3 – 5
Table 6
AHP matrix representing pairwise comparisons of material barriers, and the resulting weights.
Barrier Isotopic Chemical Radiological Mass and bulk Detectability Weight
Isotopic 1 3 2 4 8 0.43
Chemical 1/3 1 1/2 2 4 0.16
Radiological 1/2 2 1 3 6 0.27
Mass and bulk 1/4 1/2 1/3 1 2 0.09
Detectability 1/8 1/4 1/6 1/2 1 0.05
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tures are present and difﬁcult to shield. Here, it is considered that
the detectability barrier is lowest for irradiated fuel, since the mul-
titude of radioactive isotopes will give rise to a complex radiation
signature.
Unattractiveness barrier:
Processes requiring only few modiﬁcations to produce weap-
ons-usable material, such as separation processes in the reprocess-
ing plant and Pu breeding in the reactor core, have low facility
unattractiveness barriers. The barriers are considered higher in
the fuel factory segments. In the fuel factory, the resistance of fuel
assemblies is considered lower than the resistances of powders
and pellets, due to the possibility of replacing fuel pins with
dummy pins containing fertile material. Production of ﬁssile mate-
rials from operations on powders and pellets is considered less
feasible.
The accessibility barrier is determined by e.g. the extent of man-
ual vs. remote handling. Fresh fuel in storage is thus more accessi-
ble than dissolved used fuel.
Available mass barrier:
If several signiﬁcant quantities of nuclear material are present
in a segment, the available mass barrier is very low. This is the case
for most segments in this study, with separated uranium as the
only exception.
Diversion detectability barrier:
Item counting is considered more reliable than accounting for
e.g. powders and solutions. Therefore, the diversion detectability
barrier is considered to be higher for fuel elements than for the dis-
solved material in the reprocessing plant.v4.2. Barrier weights
The matrices composed of pairwise comparisons of barriers
according to AHP are shown in Tables 6, 7. The resulting weightsare presented in the same tables. Similar weights for TOPS barriers
were obtained with AHP in van der Meer et al. (2010).
The AHP-analysis shows that among the material barriers, the
isotopic composition is considered the most important, followed
by the radiological and chemical barriers. The mass and bulk bar-
rier and the detectability barrier are considered to be the least
important.
The amount of mass in the facility, together with the accessibil-
ity of the material, are the most important factors in the technical
barrier group. Unattractiveness of the facility and diversion detect-
ability are less relevant.
4.3. Resistance results
Table 8 shows the lowest resistances, i.e. the weakest links, for
each barrier category and facility segment collection, according to
the most vulnerable element approach described in Section 3.3.3.
Here, the weights in Tables 6 and 7 are taken into account. The val-
ues in Table 8 are also illustrated in Fig. 3.
In the reactor, fresh fuel is more vulnerable than used fuel
regardless of the chosen fuel cycle, due to its chemical and radio-
logical properties and easier access. Material wise, Purex offers
the lowest proliferation resistance, whereas from a technical per-
spective all three fuel cycles are equally resistant.
In the reprocessing plant, the pure Pu streams are the weak-
est links of the Purex and Purex–Diamex/Sanex reprocessing,
regarding both the material and technical barrier categories.
The isotopic and chemical barriers of pure Pu offer low prolifer-
ation resistance. In the Ganex case, the pure U stream and used
MOX + MA fuel are instead the most vulnerable segments
regarding material and technical barriers, respectively. Regarding
technical barriers, used fuel elements are more vulnerable than
all dissolved and separated materials, since they are considered
to be more accessible. From both the material and technical per-
spectives, Ganex offers the highest proliferation resistance.
Table 7
AHP matrix representing pairwise comparisons of technical barriers, and the resulting weights.
Barrier Unattractiveness Accessibility Available mass Diversion detectability Weight
Unattractiveness 1 1/4 1/6 1 0.08
Accessibility 4 1 1/2 3 0.30
Available mass 6 2 1 5 0.52
Diversion detectability 1 1/3 1/5 1 0.10
Table 8
The lowest PR values per barrier group and facility segment collection for each reprocessing option.
Reprocessing technique Reactor Reprocessing Fuel fabrication
Material Technical Material Technical Material Technical
Purex 2.3 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.6
Purex–Diamex/Sanex 3.0 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.7 1.6
Ganex 3.0 1.8 2.3 1.9 2.7 1.6
Fig. 3. Comparison of PR values for the three fuel cycle options.
396 M. Åberg Lindell et al. / Annals of Nuclear Energy 62 (2013) 390–397In the fuel factory, powders and fuel pellets are more vulnerable
than fuel elements, since they are easier to conceal and transport,
and more difﬁcult to account for. The Purex fuel cycle is the most
vulnerable material wise. The lowest technical resistance values in
the fuel fabrication segment collection are the same, regardless of
the chosen reprocessing technique.
5. Discussion
The strength of the TOPS methodology lies in comparing differ-
ent systems to each other, with no need to evaluate absolute levels
of proliferation resistance. The numbers obtained in the analysis
should thus be seen merely as relative measures. TOPS is useful
in the sense that the degree of detail concerning diversion threats,facility segmentation, and proliferation barriers, may vary depend-
ing on the purpose and scope of the study.
One important drawback of themethod is that it relies on subjec-
tive assumptionsmade by the analyst. Subjectivity can bemitigated
if several experts are consulted, but their combined judgementmay
still be biased. Even so, when discussing safeguards approaches for
new reactor types and fuel cycles, having a structuredway of evalu-
ating PR and identifying weak links in a system, such as the TOPS
methodology, is valuable.
6. Conclusions
It is noted from the results of this assessment that the prolifer-
ation resistance of material barriers in a fuel cycle involving recy-
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reprocessing cycle. Isotopic and radiological properties of the dif-
ferent forms of MOX + MA make them less vulnerable to diversion
than regular MOX.
For the purpose of safeguards, group actinide extraction should
be preferred to the reprocessing options where pure plutonium
streams occur. This is due to the fact that a solution containing
minor actinides is less attractive to a proliferator than a pure Pu
solution. If there is a pure Pu stream in the reprocessing plant, it
is found to be the weakest link. Therefore there is no difference be-
tween the Purex and Purex–Diamex/Sanex bars in Fig. 3b.
Differences between the fuel cycle options regarding weakest
links of the technical barrier group are seen only in the reprocess-
ing plant, where Ganex has an advantage due to the absence of a
pure Pu stream. In order to increase the technical PR values also
in the reactor and fuel fabrication segment collections of Gen IV
systems, the facilities should be made difﬁcult to modify and ac-
cess, and safeguards equipment should be developed to improve
precision and reliability. In this way, not only the new material
compositions will improve the proliferation resistance of future
nuclear power systems, but also new technical solutions will
contribute.
All things considered, this safeguards analysis speaks in favor of
Ganex as opposed to the Purex process. The material streams of
group actinide extraction are intrinsically more proliferation
resistant.
In the examined facilities, several signiﬁcant quantities of nu-
clear material are expected to be present in most parts of the fuel
cycle. The available mass barrier is therefore very low in most seg-ments. For a demonstration system containing a smaller reactor,
e.g. the planned Swedish LFR concept ELECTRA with a power of
0.5 MWth (Wallenius et al., 2011), together with recycling and fuel
production facilities, the material throughput will be considerably
smaller, with a stronger overall proliferation resistance of the sys-
tem according to the TOPS methodology as a direct consequence.
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